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The Development of Neoliberal Measures
of Competitiveness
Dieter Plehwe
Throughout the last few decades, international rankings and ratings have oc-
cupied an important place in the context of international politics. Tools of
quantification such as benchmarks, indices, ratings and rankings, measur-
ing countries’ democratic systems, levels of transparency and corruption, the
quality of health services, creditworthiness and so on, have become abundant
and are frequently heeded by actors in international politics (Cooley/Snyder
2015: 2; Krever 2013: 135). Although the quantification of governance as a phe-
nomenon has existed since the late 19th century (Power 1997: 17), its prolifera-
tion in the form of global performance indicators (GPIs) aligns with processes
of quantification originating in the years following the Second World War.
After 1945, data was collected to establish systematic observation of an
ever-increasing number of functional areas relevant to governance.The trans-
formation of information into numerical data facilitated the comparison of a
wide range of social systems by way of simplification. Such comparison also
established notions of sameness and comparability, driving and driven by the
process of intensified globalization (Heintz 201: 169; Wahlberg/Rose 2015). Al-
though a few indices were developed before 1990—notably GDP or the Free-
dom House Index of Political Freedom—most indicators have been set up
afterwards and over 90 per cent after the year 2000 (Cooley/Snyder 2015: 10).1
Inadvertently, the anarchic system of competing states has been turned into
a global system of (e)valuation and competition (Lamont 2012) with consid-
erable influence on the policies of individual states. Furthermore, if compe-
tition during the Cold War era was all about system competition pitching the
socialist world against capitalism, it has more recently been turned into a
1 Bandura (2008) counted 178 quantitative composite indices, 15 of which existed before
the year 2000.
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global system of competing competitions, depending on rival norms emanat-
ing from a greater variety of sources, and the objectives of a diverse set of
players.
As a result of these transformations, at least two distinct notions of com-
petition and competitive states need to be acknowledged. A traditional notion
of competition is rooted in the (neo-)realist theory of international relations,
which sees the international state system as an anarchy in which competing
states are vying for power. According to this theory, the order resulting from
the competition of states is ultimately decided by state power relations (Waltz
1979). Secondly, another theory of competitive states holds that ‘competition
states’ have advanced to the status of a normative ideal. In this understand-
ing, the question is how to improve the position of the state in a constant
process of capitalist locational competition. The local perspective is here de-
termined both by local (immobile) and global (mobile) factors of production
(Cerny 2007). Unlike neorealist IR and its notion of competing states in an an-
archicworld system, this notion of competition understands states as part of a
global order of “cosmopolitan capitalism”, which subordinates the local polit-
ical and social system to the prerogatives of an economic system conceived as
an inevitably global system (Plehwe/Slobodian 2017). While competition plays
an important role in each of the two perspectives, the relevant properties and
criteria relevant for states to prevail or succeed are quite different.
Scholars have hitherto explained the rise of global performance indica-
tors (GPI)2 and the rating and ranking organizations behind them in general
with a confluence of three developments: the turn to neoliberalism, specif-
ically the interest in establishing performance metrics; the rise of transna-
tional governance networks; and the evolution of information technology and
open data sources (Cooley/Snyder 2015: 10). These approaches, however, un-
derstate the importance of new data sources created for the specific purpose
of index construction, as I will show below.The concurrent rise of neoliberal-
ism and comparative performance indicators similarly does not address the
2 Kelley and Simmons (2019: 492) define GPIs as “a named collection of rank-ordered
data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different units”,
frequently states or regions, but also organizations. Apart from basic indicators like
GDP much use has been made of what the authors call “overtly strategic state rating
and ranking systems that package and deploy information intentionally for policy ad-
vocacy and implementation.” (Kelley/Simmons 2019: 493). The economic freedom in-
dices discussed in this chapter belong to the latter category.
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deliberate development of specific GPIs for the purpose of directing neoliberal
transformation processes and the rise of the normative ideal of ‘competition
statehood’ in the economic sense.
In order to substantiate this criticism, I will tackle the history and de-
velopment of the economic freedom indexes of the Canadian Fraser Institute
and theHeritage Foundation inWashington,DC. Looking closer at the origins
of these “devices” (Bloch/Mitterle 2017: 933), which constitute technologies of
knowledge creation, means of communication and, ultimately, “technologies
of persuasion” (Porter 1995), allows the substantiation of claims regarding the
coincidence of the rise of GPIs and neoliberalism; though we need to think of
neoliberal world politics more as a highly contested arena.
Arguments pertaining to the neoliberal character of GPIs conflate neolib-
eralism and Western traditions of rationality and power. Indicators’ power in
influencing nation-states or organizations’ dynamics of decision-making has
stirred up contentious debates in academia and international politics on the
issue of global governance.These debates focused on whether indicators were
imbued with Western notions of rationality and achievement due to their
origins in the Western world, (Cooley/Snyder 2015: 8; Diaz-Bone/Didier 2016;
Uribe 2015). In this vein, poststructuralist scholarship in international politi-
cal economy began to question the claim to neutrality of indicators and other
tools of quantification. The research thereby aimed at re-politicizing these
tools of global governance and at deconstructing the underlying neoliberal
logics (Krever 2013). By seeing all indicators as Western efforts at economic
domination, however, this scholarship misses the explicitly strategic nature
of neoliberal efforts to counter GPIs of different orientations.Why should ne-
oliberal scholars and activists bother developing specific indexes if the gen-
eral development works in their favor? If supporters of neoliberalism rightly
worry about indexes and rankings that seek to promote social development,
social equality, ecological sustainability, or economic democracy, for example,
the link between quantification and neoliberalism needs to be understood as
tenuous.
While there has been considerable attention to the links between neoliber-
alism, the transformation of governance and quantification in general, there
has been a lack of attention to the substantive influence of neoliberal ideas.
Some approaches to the measuring of the world are useful with regard to
the theorization needed to guide comparisons (Strang/Meyer 1993) and to
secure commensuration, i.e. “the transformation of qualities into quantities
that share ametric.” (Espeland/Sauder 2007: 16).The example of the economic
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freedom indexes developed by neoliberal intellectuals and think tanks of and
around the Mont Pèlerin Society (Walpen 2004; Plickert 2008, Burgin 2012) in
the course of the 1980s provides a powerful example of such theorizing, and
a daring commensuration effort seeking to establish a social technology and
policy instrument to support neoliberal reform efforts.
The first section provides an account of the intellectual background and
the social origins of economic freedom indexes in the 1970s and 1980s. Eco-
nomic freedom indexes relied on the theoretical work of a group of neolib-
erals organized in the realm of the Mont Pèlerin Society on the topic of en-
trepreneurship and competitiveness of the 1970s, and on the legal and insti-
tutional turn among public choice theorists. Apart from the key actors situ-
ated in academia and civil society, this section explains the dual meaning of
competition of states (and regions) and of competition statehood in the global
capitalist economic system, which endeavours to enable locations in the com-
petition for local (immobile) and global (mobile) factors of production.
The second section describes how economic freedom indexes were made,
focusing on the collection of data, its manipulation, and the distribution of
the results to governments and publics worldwide, using the example of the
Economic Freedom Index produced by two leading neoliberal think-tanks,
the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation in conjunction with partner
think tanks and the Wall Street Journal, respectively. The production of Eco-
nomic Freedom indexes thus is a case of how private think tanks (backed by
corporate money) have acted to set the terms of inter-state competition in the
economic field. Local conditions are judged according to howwell-suited they
are for improving conditions for local capital, and attracting and maintaining
mobile capital.
The third section then pivots to critically assess the impact of the indexes,
according to claims made by the officials and contributors of the ranking and
rating organizations, as well as both friendly observers and critics. This sec-
tion examines the linkages between neoliberal devices such as the Economic
Freedom Indexes and the transformation of global and national institutions,
which we can altogether describe grosso modo as the neoliberal transformation
of statehood and governance. To substantiate this claim we will go beyond
the discussion of the immediate impact of the economic freedom indexes by
way of taking a closer look at subsequent indexes developed to address issues
of economic governance. The original efforts of organized neoliberals pale in
comparison to the role the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business Index”. At
the level of global institutions, a new set of actors come into play, namely
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state and regional actors who are critical in the social co-production of the
public devices that seek to enable and support institutional transformations
at regional, national and international levels. The original, civil society-based
economic freedom GPIs, nevertheless continue to play a dual role in guiding
neoliberal reforms and gauging the state of neoliberal transformation. They
thereby inadvertently attest to the conflicted and contested character of the
contemporary great neoliberal transformation process at large.
The Economic Freedom Movement and Supply Side Economics
“In the most recent edition of the University of Pennsylvania’s Global Go To
Think Tanks Report, Economic Freedom of theWorld was ranked as the fifth
most influential report published by the world’s 6,618 think tanks. Nobel
Laureate Douglass North has called it the ‘best available … description of
efficient markets.’” (Fraser Institute, 2020).
The self-described ‘economic freedom movement’ responsible for the eco-
nomic freedom indices emerged in the 1970s under the ambit of the Mont
Pèlerin Society. It is based in sprawling networks of neoliberal think tanks
like the Atlas Economic Research Foundation network linked to the Mont Pè-
lerin Society (Djelic/Mousavi 2020). Its roots go back to critical assessments of
traditional economic indicators, which measured GDP and economic growth
(Schmelzer 2016). It aimed at complementing the FreedomHouse Democracy
index, which has measured civil and political rights across the world since
1972. The neoconservative bias of Freedom House (Giannone 2010) notwith-
standing, members of the Mont Pèlerin Society were ambivalent concern-
ing the usefulness of an index focused on democratic institutions, doubting
whether these could be relied upon to serve their conception of economic free-
dom.They were also hesitant about the social indicators movement (Andrews
1989), which attempted to measure the wellbeing of citizens and communi-
ties in conjunction with public policies designed to improve welfare. As such,
social indicator measures also challenged the input focus of traditional eco-
nomic indicators. The members of the Mont Pélerin Society opposed the dis-
course leading up to the Global Development Index of the United Nations. Ex-
amining the welfare of populations living in different countries and economic
systems moved a number of socialist countries in the developing world ahead
of their capitalist competitors due to their performance in areas like economic
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growth or public health—much to the dismay of neoliberals like Peter Bauer
who placed a premium value on the economic freedom of capitalists (Plehwe
2009).
In order to understand the history of the economic freedom indexes it
is necessary first to examine conceptual developments in economic theories
of entrepreneurship, innovation and competitiveness that can be summarily
labelled as supply-side economics (Feldstein 1986). These efforts date back to
the 1960s and developed rapidly in response to the stagflation crisis of the
1970s, which seemed to neoliberals to prove the failure of Keynesian demand
management. A wide range of neoliberal scholars, influenced by Austrian
economics in general and Ludwig von Mises in particular, including Herbert
Giersch in Germany and Israel Kirzner in the United States, helped to shift
the focus of economic reasoning to supply-side conditions. These scholars
and many others under the ambit of the Mont Pèlerin society emphasized the
importance of entrepreneurship, competitiveness, innovation and economic
opportunity (Plehwe 2020).
During the 1980s, the activities of this cohort of supply-side, neoliberal
economists provide a clear illustration of the importance of theorizing, and
of theoretical simplification, for the development of systems of comparison
and quantification (Heintz 2010: 169). Opposed to the ways in which quantifi-
cation was used to measure economic growth across economic systems, the
economic freedommovement was not afraid to construct direct comparisons
between conditions of economic freedom, regardless of whether the state in
question was one of the richest or poorest in the world. On the basis of a com-
mon notion of national competitiveness and the comparison of regulatory and
other conditions of private economic activity it became possible to organize
the process leading up to the construction of economic freedom indices that
thrive on “numerical difference” (Heintz 2010).
The Anglo-Hungarian development economist Peter Bauer’s critique of
statistical measures of GDP and growth is the best place to retrace the steps
from neoliberal criticism of indices and rankings to the construction of these
new neoliberal quantification projects. Crucially, these began with a rejection
of existing methods of quantification centered on GDP. Bauer’s field studies
in Africa and the Far East led him to challenge standard statistical efforts,
because the collection of data on agricultural work missed the trading ac-
tivities of peasants, and because subsistence activities escaped measurement
altogether (Bauer 1948, 1954). Such concerns with blind spots of mainstream
econometrics and GDP measures preceded the broader attack on quantita-
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tive GDP measures from a qualitative perspective (Meadows et al. 1972; cf.
Schmelzer 2016: 245f.).
After the second world war, neoliberals strongly opposed important
features of mainstream neoclassical economics, Keynesian econometrics and
modernization theory. Far from being champions of a unitary Eurocentric
tradition of quantification, the heirs of Austrian economics in particular
attacked prevailing positivist approaches to economics and the use of stan-
dardized quantitative data, on the basis of qualitative considerations. Against
mainstream recognition of the economic success of the macro-planning ef-
forts of socialist economics, neoliberals raised fundamental objections to
the calculation and to a certain extent the planning macro-economic de-
velopment. Peter Bauer and many other neoliberals emphasized choice and
freedom of choice, holding these to be more relevant than wealth. It was only
later that neoliberals made the additional claim of a positive correlation of
freedom and growth and wealth. This moment coincided with the neoliberal
turn towards techniques that claimed to quantify qualitative data (Schmelzer
2016: 288f.).
The rejection of quantification and positivism after the second world
war was complemented by another, more important shift of emphasis in
neoliberal economics. From the late 1960s, neoliberals orchestrated a re-
vival in concepts and understandings of ‘entrepreneurship’, based on the
original work of Ludwig von Mises. Against the neoclassical emphasis on
equilibrium—an ideal of marginal production without profit and loss—von
Mises had defended the priority of profit as a critical element of the price
mechanism; one that was neglected in mainstream neoclassical economics
alongside the key role of the entrepreneur. According to von Mises, every
entrepreneur, no matter the size of a company, was a critical person in the
relation of demand to supply, which he held to be impossible without profit
(Mises 1998 [1949]: 255)
Based on the principled emphasis on entrepreneurship and profit a num-
ber of neoliberals worked hard to oppose prevailing notions of the limits
and problems of entrepreneurship. Mises’ student Isaac Kirzner (1971) at-
tacked Joseph Schumpeter’s famous characterisation of entrepreneurship as
disruptive, for example, and emphasized the role of entrepreneurs with re-
gard to achieving equilibrium. Germany’s early behavioral economist Gün-
ther Schmölders, president of the MPS from 1970 to 1972, organized the So-
ciety’s general conference on the issue of entrepreneurship in Munich in 1970
(Schmölders 1971). Schmölders and colleagues in other countries launched
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surveys on the image of the entrepreneur in Germany and France, for exam-
ple. Arguably evenmore important than Kirzner or Schmölders, however, was
Herbert Giersch, the long-time president of the Kiel Institute for the World
Economy and president of the MPS from 1984 to 1986.
Giersch published his seminal work on the role of entrepreneurship, “The
Role of Entrepreneurs in the 1980s”, in 1982, and announced a new age of
Schumpeter in 1984 (Giersch 1982, 1984). Contrary to Kirzner’s effort to dis-
place Schumpeter, Giersch now claimed to rely on him, albeit selectively. Ne-
oliberals like Giersch proudly professed a new confidence in greatly expanded
notions of entrepreneurship, which went far beyond Schumpeter’s elitist un-
derstanding of successful family business founders whomade a difference for
macro-economic development. Despite his references to Schumpeter, how-
ever, Giersch’s theory effectively re-labelled the Mises entrepreneur as the
Schumpeter entrepreneur.Unlike Schumpeter’s rare species of innovative and
successful entrepreneurs, Giersch and Mises saw no limits for entrepreneurs
as long as they behaved in an entrepreneurial way. Schumpeter was nev-
ertheless a more attractive name for two reasons. Firstly, Schumpeter was
much more widely recognized and respected as a leading economist. Sec-
ondly, Schumpeter had an elaborated theory of product and process innova-
tion, which went beyondmicro-economic opportunity and which Giersch was
ready to combine with the German tradition of location theory. At the cen-
ter of Giersch’s theory of innovation, growth and economic geography was
what he called the ‘Schumpeter volcano’, a center of innovation in a specific
location, which would provide the innovating entrepreneur with a temporary
monopoly. Once the innovation lava flowed downward and cooled, competi-
tive advantage was lost. The volcano thus must continue producing new in-
novations (new technologies) or move to the margins in the process of loca-
tional competition. In reaction to the slow growth patterns of the late 1970s
and early 1980s, Giersch directly opposed Keynesian economics in his nine-
point program based on his Schumpeter hybrid. His third point said:
“What matters most in present circumstances are the driving forces of eco-
nomic development. Emphasis, therefore, is on the growth and dissemina-
tion of knowledge, on path breaking entrepreneurs and eager imitators, on
credit creation for the supply of venture capital, and on Schumpeterian com-
petition (i.e. on innovative monopolistic competition rather than sterile per-
fect competition, on oligopolistic rivalry rather than collusive equilibria and
on aggressive trading rather than arbitrage transactions). In the interna-
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tional economy, which Schumpeter mostly neglected, emphasis is on free
trade rather than fair trade (trade minus competition) and on export orien-
tation rather than import substitution.” (Giersch 1984)
Giersch’s ninth and last point reads: “Entrepreneurial talent is in almost un-
limited supply, but it often finds productive outlets only abroad, or less pro-
ductive and even counterproductive use in politics and government, public
and private bureaucracy or the military” (Giersch 1984).
Against Kirzner, Giersch also chose to reinstate Schumpeter’s ideas of in-
novator-entrepreneurship in his writing. No longer was the concern to make
entrepreneurship compatible with neoclassical theories of equilibrium. The
new emphasis was on disruption and innovation, which were now consid-
ered positive rather than disturbing.The important link between Schumpeter,
Schmölders and Giersch was the emphasis on dynamism and change, which
required entrepreneurs to manoeuvre. According to Giersch, even the under-
employed and unemployed could be turned into self-employed entrepreneurs,
provided that political institutions were adequately reformed and the correct
incentives put in place. In order to realize this potential, Giersch argued, it
was necessary to encourage a society’s demand for entrepreneurship: “the de-
mand permitted, induced or actively provoked by the socio-economic struc-
ture and the political and cultural environment” (Giersch 1982: 15).
The demand for entrepreneurship, in other words, depended on the social
arrangements in support of economic freedom. This was an understanding
that Giersch and Kirzner shared. “The central question,” Kirzner had written
in 1980s, was
“what institutional frameworks are best-suited to tap the reservoir of en-
trepreneurial alertness which is certainly present among the members of
society? ...Entrepreneurial talent is ‘switched on’ by the prospect of ‘pure
gain’—broadly defined to include fame, prestige, even the opportunity to
serve a cause or to help others.” (Kirzner 1980, emphasis added)
Progress in favor of entrepreneurship thus can be measured by reforms ded-
icated to enable the prospect of pure gain, to advance economic freedom
broadly conceived, reaching far into the non-profit sector to advance social
entrepreneurship and civic engagement. Progress in favor of entrepreneur-
ship, in this logic, requires the wholesale removal of restrictions on economic
freedom including much of the welfare state and the full range of legal regu-
latory measures that compromise price signals.
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Thus, it was possibly most important in the course of the evolution of the
economic freedommovement that Giersch, Kirzner and a wide range of other
neoliberal economists re-focused economics on the role of political and other
institutions conducive to entrepreneurship, articulating a relentless critique
of what they held to be the sclerotic developments of themodernwelfare state.
In 1985, Giersch coined the term “Eurosclerosis” in a paper arguing for com-
prehensive European deregulation and cross-border liberalisation: the pro-
gramme to complete the single European market by 1992 (Giersch 1985).
The counter-narrative to state-led development can therefore be consid-
ered as a kind of template economy: an ideal-type that serves as a benchmark
the distance to which can be judged in the world of individual countries, rich
and poor. Economic freedom indexes measure the deviation of the real model
of economic governance of a country with reference to what, according to the
normative perspective of the neoliberal economic freedom movement, con-
stitutes the universal model of optimal economic governance. Such a con-
ception allows countries to compete with one another in the extent to which
they conform to this ideal-type.The closer a country manages to approximate
the ideal type of governance tailored to economic freedom, the better it does
in the never-ending competition for optimal location according to neoliberal
reasoning.This was the backdrop of the initiative taken by the Fraser Institute
in Canada, which led the effort to turn verbal assessments and comparative
judgements into numerical difference: the social technology of economic free-
dom indexing and ranking developed into the Economic Freedom Index.
Developing indices: Ideas, Money and Networks
It is illuminating to look at the timeline of global indicator projects related
to issues of political, social and economic governance. While we can observe
early efforts to promote sustainable and human development, the Index of
Sustainable Economic Welfare (later Genuine Progress Indicator) still covers
a small range of countries only and has not been fully completed. As will be
discussed below, the Human Development Indicator under the auspices of
the United National Development Program (UNDP) in 1990 had been one of
the reasons for neoliberal circles around the Fraser Institute and the Heritage
Foundation to establish the Economic Freedom Indicators. In the meantime,
the Fraser Institute in 2018 has added the Human Freedom index (HFI) to the
Economic Freedom Index.Adding personal and civil freedom indicators to the
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staple of economic freedom indicators, HFI was an effort to shield economic
freedom from democratic concerns (Slobodian 2019). A decade after the first
economic freedom reports were published, the World Economic Forum and
the World Bank created indices (Fougner 2008) that build on the ideas put
forth by the self-declared “economic freedom movement”.
Table one: Economic and political governance indexes, timeline
Source: Cooley and Snyder 2015, Annex one, author’s selection from a total of 95 indexes
listed. Indexes in Bold highlighted are subject to closer analysis in this chapter
In the course of the 1980s,Mont Pèlerin Society circles engaged in amulti-
pronged effort to develop new ways of advancing policies based on their the-
ories concerning the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic
freedom. At the second conference dedicated to developing an economic free-
Year Index Organization
1972 Freedom in theWorld FreedomHouse
1980 Freedomof the Press FreedomHouse
1989 Index of Sustainable Eco-
nomicWelfare
Hernan Daly, John B. Cobb
(U.S.), Preceeds GPI
1990 HumanDevelopment UNDP
1995 Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation
1995 Corruption perception in-
dex
Transparency International
1996 Economic Freedom of the
World
Fraser Institute
1996 WorldWide Governance Brookings&World Bank




2006 TaxMisery and Reform Forbes
2012 International Property
Rights
Americans For Tax Reform
2018 Index of Economic Democ-
racy
New Economic Thinking
??? Genuine Process Indicator
(beyondGDP)
Different, EU, changing,
still subject to change
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dom index organized by the Fraser Institute in Vancouver in 1988, which
resulted in a volume titled Economic Freedom: Toward a Theory of Measurement
(Block 1988), William Hammett of the Manhattan Institute in New York sug-
gested that “people think that entrepreneurship is bad and we are suffering
from an overdose of it in this country” (Hammett 1988: 127). Unlike support for
political freedom, which is supported as an end in itself, Hammett claimed,
economic freedom is considered as a means to the end of wealth, which is
frequently hard to sell. Hammett used the difficulties the then-real estate de-
veloper Donald Trump faced when he wanted to evict a few rent controlled
tenants to illustrate his concern. He went on to report on his limited success
in strengthening the link between entrepreneurship and economic freedom
on previous occasions:
“I organized two conferences overseas in the last two years on the topic of
growth…In both cases we were trying to energize the debate on lowering
taxes and encouraging growth and entrepreneurship…the whole George
Gilder scenario, supply-side thing. At neither one of those conferences did
the topic of economic liberties ever come up. It was treated strictly as a
pragmatic thing. Will this produce more growth and more wealth or will it
not? …We all believe in economic freedoms here, we know what it leads to.
But it is almost an impossible chore to try to translate this to the general
public who relate much more to the concept of growth, wealth, things like
that, which is the end result of economic freedom.” (Block 1988: 127).
Sustained efforts to clarify the link between economic freedom and en-
trepreneurship aimed at defining and determining measurable conditions
of economic freedom. The earliest index proposed to measure economic
freedom came from Freedom House in the early 1980s. Freedom House
emphasized a link between democracy and economic freedom. Subsequent
measuring and indexing efforts organized by the Fraser Institute in Canada
and funded by the Liberty Fund (Indianapolis) began to de-emphasize
democracy and eventually led to the construction of the Economic Freedom
of the World Index (Gwartney et al. 1996) and to the Heritage Foundation’s
Indices of Economic Freedom (published in conjunction with the Wall Street
Journal).
Much of the groundwork for these efforts to define andmeasure economic
freedom was carried out by the MPS members Alvin Rabushka (Stanford) and
Gerald William Scully (University of Texas), often in close interaction with
MPS members from Europe. The 1988 conference proceedings (Block 1988)
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list (among others) the German libertarian science philosopher Gerard Rad-
nitzky; Antonio Martino, a founding member of Forza Italia and later Italian
minister of foreign affairs and defense; and the French libertarian essayist
Henri LePage. All were members of the Mont Pèlerin Society.
In lieu of an accepted definition of economic freedom, Alvin Rabushka’s
combination of four central elements of economic liberty were considered by
neoliberals to constitute the gold standard:
a) secure property rights;
b) voluntary exchange of individuals within and across borders;
c) absence of governmental control of the terms of transactions of individ-
uals;
d) freedom from governmental expropriation of property (e.g., by confisca-
tory taxation or unanticipated inflation) (Hanke/Walters 1992, 120-121).
All but the first element (secure right to property) emphasizes the absence of
restrictions by governments, not positive rights like a minimum social con-
dition or a clean environment, or the freedom of association. Quite to the
contrary: legal rights to form trade unions and mandated minimum wages,
for example, are considered restrictions of economic freedom because they
impede the price mechanism entrepreneurs depend on to fulfil their func-
tion in the economic system, according to the basic understanding laid out
by Ludwig von Mises. The terms of transactions of individuals are subject
to undesired external influence if trade unions determine the price of labor,
rather than shifting conditions of supply and demand.
The data that is collected and prepared for the use in the economic free-
dom indices is not readily available.Think tanks in the different countries are
charged with collecting and interpreting the data in the case of the Fraser In-
stitute effort, for example. Qualitative data (like changes in the tax code etc.)
are transformed into numerical data in order to offer an air of quantitative
‘exact’ assessment. No external and recognized academic council is involved
in checking the data or the interpretation for accuracy and reliability. But the
large number of countries and the long time period covered in the meantime
offers a data source that is now readily available for use by think tank pun-
dits and in universities and academic research institutes. Beyond academic
research, the data is widely cited in media outlets and has been used in eco-
nomic governance reforms at various times in a number of countries, notably
in Central and Eastern Europe (Gwartney/Lawson 2003). Heritage indices and
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rankings are relied upon to allocate US foreign aid through the Millennium
Challenge Corporation, for example.3
To improve the academic utility of the index, data has also been added
for the period before the two economic freedom indexes were started. The
extension draws on data sources from OECD countries and goes back to 1850
(Prados de la Escosura 2016). Regardless of the increasing efforts by the pro-
ducers of the Economic Freedom Index to obtain academic standing, it is
essential to take a closer look into the ways in which such ready for use data
have been produced. Anybody who relies on the Economic Freedom Index
data without subjecting the figures to critical investigation by way of looking
into the sources and the ways in which the information has been transformed
into quantitative indicators buys into the economic freedom ideology of the
producers of the index, which at the same time leads to surprisingly different
results in the position of countries like Russia or the Netherlands in the two
rankings (Ram 2014).
More important than specific measures and valuations, of course, has
been the overall message: economic liberalization will be economically ben-
eficial, supporting entrepreneurship and growth. Regardless of significant
qualifications, academic studies that employ the apparently more widely used
Fraser Index are held to confirm this expectation (Haan/Sturm 2000). Jeffrey
Sachs (2005) disputes such claims, however, and Ram (2014) demonstrates the
fundamental flaws of the datasets, which undermines the very possibility of
drawing such conclusions. It is in any case fascinating to observe how early
neoliberal critiques of indices such as GDP and positivist accounts of eco-
nomic growth have given way to generate instruments claiming the value of
(pseudo-positivist, to be sure) instruments to improve growth. Ironically, the
economic freedom movement appears to be complicit in the old bandwagon
game: if you cannot beat them, join them. But the shift of attention to insti-
tutional conditions of economic activities must still be considered creative,
helping to pave the way for the wider concerns of James Buchanan’s public
choice and Douglass North’s new economic institutionalism.
3 See www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/indicators (last access December 18, 2020)
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Creating the Data You Need: Using the Index and its Data Sources
MPS members themselves took stock of the impact of the index at the Chat-
tanooga regional meeting in 2003. Among the highlights reported were in-
creasing media coverage of the Economic Freedom Index by quality journals
like the Economist, the increasing reliance of professional economists on the
index data in academic journals, new software projects to make easier use of
the data, regional spin off projects in China and North America, a better un-
derstanding of the link between institutional environment and investment,
and, last not least, a number of individual country examples of policy im-
pact (Gwartney/Lawson 2003). The project has since expanded to cover more
developing regions like the Maghreb World.
The history of this collective effort in the social construction of a neolib-
eral understanding of economic freedom as a precondition for entrepreneur-
ship, and the important differences to the parallel development of national
competitiveness indexes (on the International Institute of Management and
the World Economic Forum, cf. Davies 2014) have been discussed by MPS
member Steve Hanke and his co-author Stephen Walters in the Cato Journal
(Hanke/Walters 1996).TheGlobal Competitiveness Indicator of theWorld Eco-
nomic Forum draws on a wide and diverse set of data including infrastruc-
ture, health, education, product and labor market efficiency, state of techno-
logical development, and so on. The index relies on both public data sources
and perceptions of business leaders. It thus has little in common with GPIs
like the economic freedom indices that are designed to address the regulatory
framework of private economic activities that are subject to political change.
Unlike managerial indices and ratings, the economic freedom indices do not
aim at appraising endowments and infrastructures relevant for planning and
forecasting. All measures are about institutions that can be changed by polit-
ical means.
The economic freedom index endeavour has thus been conceived and
strategically developed as a comprehensive and universal neoliberal policy
tool, directed to remove restrictions on private sector economic activi-
ties needed to strengthen—in Giersch’s terms—the demand side for en-
trepreneurship. But this purpose need not to be the only function of the
index. Inadvertently and at the same time the yearly results can also be read
as a measure of the state of neoliberal transformation. Attacks on neoliberal
reforms, like the nationalization of erstwhile privatized companies or sig-
nificant re-regulation, led to setbacks and roll back of neoliberal reforms in
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quite a few countries. In particular in times of economic crisis, voters and
politicians frequently show a taste for policy preferences that lead to lower
values in the economic freedom ranking.The numerical representation allows
neoliberal reform forces to point to such decline to voice concern with regard
to the conditions of economic freedom in a country, without discussing
the details of individual measures. For those who oppose neoliberalism,
index data similarly offers opportunities to identify countries in which the
opposition to neoliberal reforms has made gains.
A great example of neoliberal data use of the neoliberal production of in-
dex data is Johan Norberg’s (2001) “In defense of global capitalism”, a pop-
ular booklet written to provide a counter narrative to the alter-globalisation
movement of the late 1990s. Much of the statistical material used to support
the claim that free market capitalism is good for development, the environ-
ment and gender relations comes from the data sources created by the Fraser
Institute and its allies of the Economic Freedom project.
In her work on quantification as a means of communication, Bettina
Heintz (2010) de-emphasizes the relevance of social networks in terms
of their relevance for globalization processes. She argues that means and
modes of communication are more relevant than the social relationships
across borders. The social construction and the use and communication of
economic freedom data and rankings suggest that we may need to rethink
her argument that relies on functional differentiation. In the case of the
neoliberal networks in charge of economic freedom indices, production and
communication are closely intertwined and embedded in transnational think
tank networks.
Arguably even more relevant than the influence exerted by think tank net-
works and organized neoliberal intellectuals of the economic freedom move-
ment has been the influence of the ideas promoted by these forces on global
governance elites in more powerful institutions like the World Bank. While
the Economic Freedom Indexes have received a fair amount of criticism from
progressive forces, the contested character of neoliberal transformation pro-
cesses and the pertinent use of indexes and ranking instruments can be clari-
fied best by way of examining the younger but bigger brother of the economic
freedom indexes, the World Bank’s Ease to do Business Index.
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Intermediate Influence: Normalizing and Generalizing
Neoliberal Ways of Thinking
TheWorld Bank’s Ease of doing Business Index (EODB) shares with the Eco-
nomic Freedom Indexes the idea of measuring the quality of the legal insti-
tutional environment of private sector economic activity across the different
countries. A stylized medium sized company has been imagined for which
the conditions are established in the different countries around the globe.
The EODB-Index goes deeper into themicro-economic dimension of business
activity than do the Economic Freedom Indexes. They add the regulatory di-
mension of starting a business, of credit facilitation, and employing or firing
workers, for example. In principle, however, the World Bank’s index follows
a supply side economic logic very similar to the economic freedom indexes.
How did the index come about?
The key person behind the index is Bulgaria’s most illustrious economist,
finance minister and World Bank director, Simeon Djankov. As co-founder of
the index Djankov worked at the World Bank and was a non-resident senior
fellow of the economic think-tank the Peterson Institute before he became
deputy prime minister and finance minister of Bulgaria. Apart from his affil-
iation with high end economic research institutes, Djankov also took part in
activities of the Atlas Economic research foundation network of think tanks
linked to the Mont Pèlerin Society and the Economic Freedom Movement at
large.4 Djankov can be considered a—if not the—key global intellectual be-
hind the drive toward market oriented institutional reforms. He easily oper-
ated in and between academia, think tanks, national government and global
institutions illustrating both the interaction and the coalescence of different
sources of (epistemic and political, national and international) authority (cf.
Zürn 2017 on such “liquid” authority).
Djankov was asked to participate in writing the World Development Re-
port of 2002 titled “Building Institutions for Markets”. Djankov turned to An-
drei Shleifer, an American economist at Harvard, who had worked on insti-
tutions and varieties of capitalism. Schleifer was willing to collaborate on the
report if the project involved committing to gathering cross-country datasets
4 See for Djankov’s biographical background www.doingbusiness.org/en/about-us/fou
nders and https://www.atlasnetwork.org/about/people/simeon-djankov (last accessed
04.01.2021).
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on institutions (Djankov 2016: 247). Together with Djankov and a range of col-
leagues a number of background papers were produced, which relied heavily
on rational choice institutionalism developed by Douglas North and public
choice literature, among other sources. Overlaps with the neoliberal sources
of the economic freedommovement and the producers of the Economic Free-
dom Indexes are abundant. The first publication on the regulation of market
entry (Djankov et al. 2002) draws on public choice inspired bureaucracy and
corruption theory to develop the comparative framework and criteria for the
index.The other papers backing the index development are written verymuch
in the same public choice spirit.5 Unsurprisingly, the EODB-Index has run
into heavy criticism. Arguably because of its success detailed in review pa-
pers, which single out the number of academic articles using the data (more
than 1.000 in 2013) and the number of political reforms inspired by the index,
the methodology of the index has been attacked from many sides (compare
“A Review of doing Business” Acemoglu et al. 2013).6 The strongest defense
of the report by the review committee points to the Scandinavian countries,
which do quite well in the World Bank’s index. Accusations of neoliberal de-
ception are unfounded according to the authors, because the index deals only
with about 100 of more than 14.000 regulations of the European Union, for
example (Acemoglu et al. 2013: 6).
This response clearly misses the point. If a set of just one hundred reg-
ulations is singled out to compare countries in de-contextualized ways, the
result is quite likely to be skewed. If, for example, regulations to start and run
businesses and to hire and fire workers are quite positive in Scandinavia from
a neoliberal perspective, the ways in which an expanded welfare state and a
high unionization rate mitigate the impact of business flexibility on labor is
obviously not addressed. Such selective representation of facts about a coun-
try uses Scandinavia to promote business models that are not very much like
the Scandinavian models taken as a whole.
In some ways the Economic Freedom Indexes are franker and less diplo-
matic than the EODB-Index because they don’t make a secret of their dislike
of labor market deregulation, for example. The reason for diplomacy at the
World Bank is obvious on the other hand.The index ran into serious criticism
5 Compare the compilation of papers at https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodolog
y (last accessed 07.09.2020).
6 350 by 2013 claims the Review paper from 2013, and almost 2000 claims Steve Hanke
of the Cato Institute (2013).
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with regard to the labor market measurements on the one hand, and with
regard to the disclosure of income of politicians on the other hand (Djankov
2016: 248). The first measure was dropped from the ranking and the second
was not taken up by the World Bank. Even the World Bank project cannot es-
cape contestation and needs to invest heavily in corrections and legitimization
efforts, as demonstrated by frequent changes to the methodology between
2005-2017. It appears as if the perceived power of the World Bank’s index
generates the contestation (Kelley/Simmons 2019; Doshi et. al 2019). Strong
criticism of the World Bank’s index from China in turn sparked a defensive
response from members of the Economic Freedom movement (Hanke 2013).
Apart from the general closeness of the Economic Freedom Index and the
EODB-Index, which both are designed to reproduce neoliberal ideas of law
in the service of private business activities and entrepreneurship, the two de-
vices both seem to revive ordoliberal ideas of an institutional framework for a
market economy as pure as possible. Unlike the Economic Freedom Indexes,
the neoliberal assessment of legal institutions gains weight at theWorld Bank
because the index data accrue meaning of standards and instruments of con-
ditionality (Krever 2013).
The neoliberal intellectual efforts behind the economic freedom in-
dices—particularly their shared focus on supply-side reforms, entrepreneur-
ship and public choice-type institutional analysis—conjunction with the per-
sonal experience of the decline and eventual collapse of socialist economies
have clearly shaped Djankov’s economic understanding. The World Bank’s
index co-developed by Djankov in turn informed the Atlas Foundation’s eco-
nomic freedom campaigns in various countries, notably India. India has been
a prominent user of the EODB-Index to guide domestic reforms under Prime
Minister Narendra Modi. On top of using the device to promote neoliberal
reforms at the national level, his right-wing government replicated the index
at the domestic level to push the different provinces in the direction of dereg-
ulation (Doshi et al. 2019: 633f.).The creation of the EODB-Index at the World
Bank was arguably a significant upgrade for the Fraser and Heritage led
efforts. Due to the weight of the World Bank for the international investment
and policy-making community, governments are considerably more under
pressure from a World Bank rating than from rankings established by civil
society-based think tank networks. Unsurprisingly, the “market share” of
the EODB-Index among the “cognate economic indicators” (including the
two economic freedom indexes studied here) is calculated at 65.26 per cent,
compared to 16.46 per cent for the global competitiveness index of World
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Economic Forum (WEF); 8.07 per cent for the Heritage Foundation’s Index
of Economic Freedom, and 2.8 per cent for the Fraser Institute’s Economic
Freedom Index (Doshi et al. 2019: 618).
The relevance of the Fraser and Heritage efforts can thus be seen less in
the institutional weight of the economic freedom indexes as such. They have
become stepping stones in the process of redirecting more relevant private
(World Economic Forum) and public (World Bank) institutions that provide
much more weight and authority to the cause of economic freedom. In ad-
dition to the numerical difference of the indicators and rankings we need to
consider the institutional difference.Neoliberal ideas become quite a bit more
powerful once they enter the realm of the powerful global financial institu-
tions at the core of contemporary global governance and neoliberal transfor-
mation processes. In the process of two decades, national and regional com-
petitiveness norms and concerns advanced from the status of pro-business
ideology nurtured by neoliberal intellectuals and think tanks to thoroughly in-
stitutionalized normswithin the hierarchy of intertwined global and domestic
institutions—a powerful example of the agenda-setting capacity of neoliberal
think tanks.
Conclusion
The impact of the economic freedom indices developed by neoliberal think
tanks around the Fraser Institute and by Heritage Foundation and the Wall
Street Journal in the 1990s has been underestimated rather than overesti-
mated, even if the indexes remain subject to severe criticism and academic
use of the data seems unimpressive. Examining the genesis of neoliberal eco-
nomic freedom indexes enables us to better comprehend the ability of neolib-
eral intellectuals to develop new concepts labelled ‘supply-side economics’,
which are based on neoliberal norms and principled beliefs that were subse-
quently used as critical tools in a wide range of media and policy circles to
change perceptions of the world.
The indices provided a policy instrument and knowledge reservoir for a
broad range of social actors frequently based in think tanks linked to the At-
las network.The self-declared economic freedommovement behind the push
for economic freedom indices focused attention on legal and other regulatory
institutions subject to political change. The economic freedom indices were
designed as tools of neoliberal policy reforms, guiding the larger process of
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neoliberal transformation.The development and articulation of a new under-
standing of entrepreneurship and the institutional requirements for innova-
tion and economic development enabled the economic freedom movement
to develop indices and to stage-manage the numerical depiction of alleged
economic freedoms. The building of the collective transnational indicators
project could draw on neoliberal civil society networks and served to expand
and stabilize the work of this group of non-state actors. It attests to the capac-
ity of neoliberal networks of intellectuals and think tanks to institutionalize
new expertise and thus to advance an effort to change the global knowledge
power structure (Strange 1988) by way of introducing new data sources, insti-
tutions, social technologies and communication circuits. Neoliberal networks
did not just draw on a wider range of open data resources but displayed a
critical ability to generate their own databases tailored to the needs of the
economic freedom arguments. Born in critical distance to indices focused on
macro-economic growth like GDP measures, economic freedom indices have
lately been used to legitimate free market reforms based on claims of a close
correlation of economic freedom and growth.
From a historical perspective, such arguments made in favor of economic
freedom indices avoid the fundamental question: why have growth rates been
higher across the OECD world and the Global South during the time of wel-
fare state expansion and planning compared to the recent era of welfare state
retrenchment? The indices are also silent on the crucial issue of asymmetries
and uneven distribution. The design of the economic freedom indices sug-
gests a causal relationship between economic freedom and economic benefits
for the whole of society, although welfare state regimes and rules benefitting
the working class and the poor are cast in a negative light.The evident attempt
to support economic freedom for the rich in turn implies the question: what
about economic freedom for the rest of us (Stanford 1999)? Indices and ratings
are social constructions for discursive and political purposes. The critical use
of indices needs to address the purposes for which they have been crafted.
Beyond the results achieved by the own civil society-based effort of the
economic freedom movement it is important to discuss the wider influence
of neoliberal economic ‘freedom’ reasoning in other indexes and rankings,
which are arguably more influential in the assessment and transformation
of economic governance than the Economic Freedom Indices themselves. As
one scholar looking at the two most important legal indicator projects, the
Ease of Doing Business Index and the Worldwide Governance Indicators ar-
gues: “these reproduce a narrow neoliberal conception of law as a platform for
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private business and entrepreneurial activity, and institutional support for a
system of laissez faire markets” (Krever 2013: 131) In addition to the numer-
ical difference Bettina Heintz has explained we need to recognize the insti-
tutional difference. It matters which private or public institution generates
data and turns it into standards and conditions of the interaction between
the public and the private sphere. Contrary to Heintz’s particular emphasis
on communication, it is necessary to insist on the relevance of social networks
and their relevance at the interface of generation and communication of data.
The links between the economic freedom movement and the World Bank ef-
fort also suggests to keep an eye on the institutional conditions of successful
communication.
In addition to the necessary emphasis on “institutional difference” when
it comes to global performance indicators, this chapter has demonstrated the
ways in which the original neoliberal conceptions of economic freedom and
market institutions have been created and strategically advanced. It thereby
uncovers a hithertomissing link between the rise of neoliberalism and the rise
of global performance indicators. It sheds light on the ongoing competition
between different sets of performance indicators, and the ongoing compe-
tition of states through different sets of indicators in this age of neoliberal
transformation.
More research is needed to assess the competition between progressive
and neoliberal indicator systems. Even if it is more right than wrong to speak
of a neoliberal era, the ideas, concepts and normative leanings of neoliberal
agents and agencies are not universally accepted and subject to criticism of
countervailing forces, as evidenced by rival indices produced by the Human
Development Project or the Real Progress Indicator Project. Yet in spite of
such competition, so far, a comprehensive attack on narrow neoliberal eco-
nomic governance projects and their indicators is largely absent.
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